Thus, in our view, complementarity is not only a factor of stability, but it is also important in times of change.
Indications of change are: (a) the increasing shareholder orientation of companies, (b) the strategic reorientation of the big banks from the Hausbank paradigm to investment banking that resulted in a loosening or abolishment of ties with industrial companies, (c) the withdrawal of the state from infrastructural sectors via privatization and (d) the break of continuity in German company regulation that supported and accelerated shareholder orientation and network dissolution.
We distinguish three phases. First, there were isolated and limited impulses for change up to the 1980s. In the second phase, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, first indications of multiple and mutually reinforcing change showed up. The break with organised capitalism came in the second half of the 1990s. The most important events were the reorientation towards shareholder orientation of companies like Bayer, Hoechst, Daimler-Benz and VEBA, starting around 1995; the takeover battle between Krupp and Thyssen in 1997, when a hostile takeover attempt was supported by one of the three German big banks for the first time; the privatisation of Deutsche Telekom in 1996; and the KonTraG law of 1998 that outlawed most forms of unequal voting rights. Changes started at the firm level but were soon translated into political change at the regime level, which then led to a reformulation of regulations.
The chapter will be organised as follows. In the next four sections, we will discuss the disorganisation process in each of the spheres that characterised corporate governance in organised capitalism. In the final section we will show how the four spheres are 2 linked with each other and how disorganisation processes in one sphere reinforced similar processes in others. The paper concludes little discussion of the consequences for the German variant of capitalism, in particular for the willingness of companies to internalise public interest.
Shareholder Value
Social responsibility traditionally played a prominent role in the German ideal of entrepreneurship. Industrial leaders of the past like Werner von (here starts p. 181)
Siemens, Ernst Abbe and Hugo Stinnes were admired both for their success in business and their public spirit. 4 The concept of the embedded firm influenced
German business law and is deeply rooted in German society. It was so prominent that in the 1970s accountants began to discuss methods of 'social accounting'.
In the 1980s, academic discourse changed towards financial indicators. But it was not until the mid-1990s that some of the largest companies began to experiment with elements of a shareholder oriented strategy. The starting point for the adoption of shareholder-oriented practices was different in each. 5 The management of the formerly state-owned VEBA (energy, now e.on) used elements of shareholder value strategy to change the bureaucratic spirit of the company; Jürgen Schrempp's proclamation of shareholder value principles enabled him to change the strategic orientation of Daimler-Benz (now Daimler-Chrysler) completely; 6 the management of highly diversified Bayer (chemicals and pharmaceuticals) increased the transparency of company reports to demonstrate that the disinvestments many analysts called for
were not necessary; Jürgen Dormann, on the contrary, refocused and merged Hoechst (chemicals, now Aventis) in the name of shareholder value; and Gerhard Cromme introduced an aggressive takeover approach as an offensive strategy to overcome the technological backwardness of steel giant Krupp (now ThyssenKrupp).
In the following years more and more companies declared shareholder value to be a main factor guiding their operation. In the late 1990s a clear pattern evolved:
shareholder orientation was more pronounced in companies where ownership by institutional investors (investment and pension funds) was large, and also in companies that were affected by international product market competition or exposed Another reason why managers themselves may be interested in a shareholder-oriented company policy is that it legitimates higher pay. One side effect of a shareholder value policy is an increase in the variable part of managerial compensation, particularly in the form of stock options. 8 The reasoning involved is that managers will be more attentive to shareholder interests if their pay fluctuates in accordance with returns on equity. Managers usually receive stock options in addition to their fixed salaries. Shareholder value strategies thus tend to increase manager's salaries.
In the late 1990s the fixed parts of managerial compensation increased rapidly as well.
Among other things, this had to do with the decreasing bank monitoring (see below).
In the past, board membership of bankers had significantly lowered managerial remuneration. 9 The impact of shareholder orientation on top management compensation demonstrates that managers themselves may have an interest in a reorientation of company policy. Not by accident, the shareholder value phenomenon appears at a time when the extent of internal control over management seems to be declining.
The orientation towards shareholder value in many companies reduced the commitment to take societal and collective aspects into account. Daimler-Benz, which used to be deeply involved in the German system of organised capitalism -shielded against unfriendly takeovers on the one hand, and acting with national responsibility in the integration of bankrupt AEG 10 
Network dissolution
The cohesion and density of the German network of interlocking directorates and ownership ties decreased significantly in the late 1990s, which has drastically undermined opportunities for coordinating economic interests.
In the past it was said that managers acting in the centre of this network were capable of controlling economic and political processes far beyond the borders of their own companies. The term Deutschland AG (Germany Inc.) was often used as a label for this special feature of the German economy. It implied that the managers involved pursued not only the economic interest of their own companies but also considered general interests of the national economy.
Opportunities for coordinating company behaviour were rooted in a combination of structural components that made cooperation among potential competitors easier. An essential feature of this structure were high density networks within branches of industry. This factor was associated with several additional features favouring coordination: a high degree of ownership concentration, meaning that firms were mostly ruled by other firms (Konzernierung); high congruence between interlocking directorates and capital relationships, whereby personal ties exceeded the scope of the ownership network; a frequent overlap between official business and employers' associations on the one hand and the 'multiple directors', the individuals most integrated into the network, on the other. 12 The core of this structure was made up of a centre integrating the largest German companies into a network more dense and closely knit than hardly anywhere else in the Western world. 
6
The Deutschland AG was characterised by a fit between the economic strategies of the state, the banks and industrial companies. The latter profited from the internalisation of risks by the company network, could rely on their Hausbanks to prevent bankruptcies, and could concentrate on growth of sales as they were protected from hostile takeovers. Banks had freedom of action in industrial policy and company monitoring, initiating restructuring in several sectors, while the state could normally abstain from direct intervention and, in the case of company crises, helped build anticrisis cartels. In such exceptional situations, finance companies were sometimes forced to make concessions to prevent bankruptcies. Extensive personal links existed between the state and large banks, especially with respect to foreign economic policy. 16 In the Landesbanken, like WestLB and Bayerische LB, which were intensely engaged in regional industrial policy, regional authorities were directly involved as shareholders.
As financial companies were at the centre of the company network, the issue of interlocking capital was closely linked to that of the power of the banks. In the mid1960s, discussion about the multiple supervisory board mandates held by bankers led to a legal limitation of the permitted number of mandates per person ('Lex Abs'). 17 This resulted in a restructuring of the network of interlocking directorates, but it did not change the position of the main financial companies inside the network.
Supervisory board mandates were passed to other representatives from the same banks. 18 The structure of the network remained the same and remained stable until the 1990s.
Extensive restructuring of the corporate network started in the late 1980s and picked up speed in the mid-1990s. Until the mid-1980s, the extent of interlocking directorates between the 100 biggest German companies was stable; starting in 1984, it began to decline from 12 percent of all possible interlocks to less than 7 percent by 1998. 19 Capital ties between financial and industrial companies also began to dissolve in the late 1990s. Between 1996 and 1998, the number of capital ties between the 100 biggest German companies declined from 169 to 108. 20 Deutsche Bank and Dresdner 
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Due to its limited range the privatisation program of the mid-1980s was criticised as 'half-hearted' 28 or largely 'symbolic' 29 . Many observers had the impression that the only point on which the coalition was united was the need to sell parts of the 'family silver' in order to raise money for the state budget. 30 It is not surprising that the privatisation of state ownership at that time had only limited effects on the German stock exchange or the corporate governance system as a whole. At the end of the 1980s further steps towards deregulation and privatisation seemed unlikely. 31 The symbolic policy had pacified the liberals, and political and societal opposition to privatisation appeared strong enough to inhibit further reforms.
The widely predicted deadlock in privatisation did, however, not occur. 32 The German government was thus forced at the European level to take steps toward liberalisation that would have been impossible to achieve nationally. 33 While European initiatives kept privatisation on the political agenda, it was German unification that put it on top of the priority list. All of a sudden more than 8,000
nationalised firms and holding companies with 4.1 million workers had to be converted into private sector firms in a market economy. The German government decided to sell off East German firms through a federal agency, the Treuhandanstalt.
Vouchers or other forms of privatisation were not considered. The direct effect of the denationalisation program on German corporate governance therefore remained (here starts p. 188) small. As it turned out, the privatisation methods of the Treuhandanstalt produced gigantic losses instead of the expected profits. 34 This increased the need to reduce state deficits and indirectly paved the way for privatisation in the West.
In combination with European liberalisation, German unification ended hesitation regarding the denationalisation of the monopolistically organised sheltered sectors of telecommunications, postal services and the railroads. On the one hand, it would have been difficult to legitimate both deficit-making state monopolies in the West at a time of harsh privatisation in the East. On the other hand, given increasing public deficits, the German state was not able to finance the rebuilding of the telecommunication and railway systems of East Germany without external capital. The Maastricht Treaty, in effect since 1993, had in addition made deficit reduction a higher priority.
Previous discussions on the modernisation of the federally operated Post Office, the Deutsche Bundespost, accelerated and shifted radically towards the privatisation option in the 1990s. The Bundespost was divided into three parts which were converted into incorporated companies (Deutsche Telekom AG, Deutsche Post AG and Deutsche Postbank AG). Prolonged discussions about how to reform the stateoperated railroad, the Deutsche Bundesbahn (now Deutsche Bahn AG), also gained momentum after unification. 35 Deutsche Telekom, as mentioned above, went public in 1996, and state ownership was further reduced in several steps to the present level of 30.9 percent. 36 Deutsche Post was listed on the stock exchange in 2000. 28.8 percent of the stock is now privately owned and a second public offering is expected in the near future. Deutsche Postbank was sold completely to Deutsche Post in 1999, and
Deutsche Bahn is prepared to go public in the next few years. These cases of privatisation, along with many others like Deutsche Lufthansa, the airports of Hamburg and Frankfurt, and even the Bundesdruckerei, the government printing office whose business includes the printing of bank notes, identity cards and passports, generated DM 37.6 billion in revenue between 1994 and 2000 (see figure   1 ).
-see Figure 1 at the end ot the document - The effects of privatisation on capital markets, the banking sector and German corporate governance in general were not taken much into consideration in the political decision-making processes of the 1990s. 40 The mostly unintended effects of privatisation are nevertheless large. The privatisation of Deutsche Telekom stimulated for the German capital market, also many of the privatised companies are at the forefront in adopting shareholder value practices. In the previously sheltered sectors we can now observe tough competition, a global market orientation and a radical reduction in employment. Traditionally a (here starts p. 190) counterpart to the internationally competitive export sectors, and as such an integral element of German organised capitalism, these sectors have changed almost beyond recognition.
Political reforms
The cooperative relationship between big German companies, with financial companies in the centre of a network of interlocking capital relations and directorates, was to a considerable extent a product of politics. In the era of post-war reconstruction, the state pressured banks and insurance companies to give financial support to industrial companies, which led to financial companies holding large equity stakes. 41 Companies were highly taxed on profits from sales of share blocks, while profits on blocks they held on to were taxed favourably. reforms in stock market and company regulation began. 42 The reforms aimed to add a more active capital market to the German model without changing its fundamental corporate governance practices. In 1986 a reorganisation of the stock exchange system went under way, combined with a slight increase in the protection of minority shareholders.
However, the move towards a corporate governance system more strongly driven by capital markets did not start before 1996 and 1998, when the Corporate Sector Supervision and Transparency Act (KonTraG) 43 German companies began to compete for capital market orientation, which for decades had been considered practically irrelevant. As a consequence, the coherence of economic policy seemed to vanish. Suddenly interlocking directorates, insideroriented accounting standards and limited minority shareholder protection were inconsistent with the political goals of an emerging 'competition state' 48 . The takeover wave in the USA illustrated the importance of share prices in competition between companies, and in 1990 a tire producer, Continental, became the first German target of a hostile takeover attempt. In this situation the CDU -encouraged by its coalition partner, the Liberals -changed towards a more sceptical view of German corporate (here starts p. 192) governance. Various spectacular company crises -Klöckner, Bremer Vulkan, Metallgesellschaft, Schneider -added to the willingness to reform.
The move towards a more market-driven corporate governance system was made possible by a specific constellation of actors. The competition-limiting institutions of German organised capitalism were politically attacked from two different directions.
The Left, including trade unions, criticised interlocking directorates and ownership networks because of the power they gave to banks. 49 Liberals, both politicians and mainstream economists, interpreted such institutions as welfare-reducing rent seeking arrangements. 50 Coming from different ideological points of view, both sides agreed that banks should be barred from owning blocks of industrial shares.
When the KonTraG was debated in the Bundestag, it turned out that the Deutschland AG no longer had political supporters. Liberals complained that they unfortunately could not push the CDU towards more radical reforms. The SPD called the KonTraG a law to protect managers against shareholders and demanded a stronger shareholder orientation. The Greens argued that the capital market should be transformed into a market for corporate control, and even a speaker of the post-communist PDS criticised that interlocking ownership eliminated competition. 51 In the late 1990s, no political party or movement was in sight that would have been willing to veto the reforms -as long as the points of reference were capital ties, the power of banks, transparency, supervisory board organisation and the reduction of capital market restrictions. Even
Social Democrats and trade unionists opted for more market-driven arrangements. In contrast to this, any attempt to restrict codetermination of employees would have immediately been blocked by trade unions, Social Democrats and the trade union wing of the CDU. In the discussion about a more market-driven corporate governance system, the CDU came closest to being the party of traditional organised capitalism, pointing out that the German system was not worse than the American system. In the debate on the takeover law in 2001, it was the CDU that wanted managements to have more powers in defending companies against hostile takeovers.
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Two possible paths existed to move away from interlocking capital and especially from industrial capital held by banks. The first, mostly demanded by the Left, was to make it illegal for financial companies to own more than five per cent of the shares of an industrial company. Liberals insisted that this was only possible in combination with lower taxes on profits from the sale of share blocks, which was the second possible path. Otherwise, they argued, a law against industrial ownership of banks would be an act of (here starts p. 193) expropriation. 53 It was a political surprise for all observers including capital market participants that the Schröder government opted for the total abolishment of the capital gains tax. It was a 'Nixon goes to China' situation 54 which made this decision possible. Under the Kohl government, even a reduction of the tax was thought to be politically unfeasible. 55 Schröder and his
Finance Minister used an opportunity to disentangle interlocking capital by strengthening forces that already existed, without having to fear the opposition of large companies.
The dynamics of change
We have argued that the German variant of organised capitalism changed towards greater market orientation because of simultaneous and mutually reinforcing developments. Impulses for change in corporate governance already existed before the mid-1980s, but they remained isolated and resulted in adjustments within the logic of the old regime. The path of institutional reproduction was not left until the mid-1990s. The interaction between privatisation and shareholder orientation was twofold. The sale of blocks of shares held by the state exposed companies like VEBA to the market for hostile takeovers, which forced them to become more share-price oriented.
Additionally, the deregulation of infrastructural sectors led to increased competition and need for restructuring. In this situation, managements used the shareholder value (here starts p. 194) concept to enforce restructuring internally. VEBA, RWE, Viag and Deutsche Telekom rapidly adopted international accounting, stock option programs, intensive investor relations and profitability targets for the business segments or the company as a whole.
Privatisation also had an impact on the strategic change of banks towards investment banking as investment banks received lucrative orders to organise privatisation. As banks changed their behaviour towards hostile takeovers, they added to the willingness of managers to become investor-oriented. There also were links between the reorientation of the banks, the sale of company stocks, and the shareholder orientation of non-financial companies. As financial companies became more shareholder-oriented by themselves, they began to reorganise their investment portfolios to raise short-term profitability. In this they passed on the pressure for more profitability to the non-financial companies. When financial companies sold their nonfinancial share blocks, the number of shares potentially available for hostile bidders rose.
These processes, in turn, changed the interests of the banks in company regulation. As The shareholder value trend in many of the largest industrial companies also affected the relationship between corporations and the state. In the past, managers of large companies often emphasized their responsibility for their employees, their region and the society as a whole. Even if this was lip service in some cases, in others there are indications that companies did act with a degree of social or national responsibility.
For good or bad, shareholder value oriented companies have no longer any need nor legitimacy to do this, and the state is no longer able to appeal to their responsibility.
These are now obliged only to satisfy shareholder interests.
The same holds true for the financial sector. As banks abandoned their interlocking directorates and ownership ties, they also got out of reach of the state, which could no longer use them as vehicles to influence companies in line with common goals, such as industrial policy. Today, there is no economic or political reason for banks to continue to provide for the coordination of the German economy. Banks now refuse to be guarantors of the public or national interest. In the debates over corporate governance reform, the discrepancy between the goal of the states to develop a more market-driven corporate governance system and its design for banks to be available to avert the bankruptcy of large industrial firms became obvious. This might have been the reason why the Finance Ministry of the Schröder government opted to drop the tax on capital gains from block sales, and not for prohibition of industrial investment by banks.
The disintegration of organised capitalism in the field of corporate governance seems irreversible. German company law supported and accelerated the trend towards a new corporate governance system and now makes a return to the former system unlikely.
Regulatory decisions, e.g., on the prohibition of unequal voting rights, cannot be reversed easily. Furthermore, change happened not on the periphery of the German economy. Those companies that once were at the centre of the 'Deutschland AG' -the largest private banks and financial companies and the highly internationalised industrial firms -have adopted new strategies and will not return to their strategies of the past.
What impact does change in corporate governance have on other parts of the German institutional order? Changes in corporate governance have gone further than in other fields. As a result we may be observing a process of hybridisation of the once highly coherent German institutional system. Market orientation in corporate governance increased while other institutions stayed intact or changed only marginally. We already have indications that shareholder value strategies of firms and more marketoriented forms of corporate governance do not necessarily jeopardise the existence of codetermination and sectoral collective agreements. 57 At the same time, the same trends will probably change the distribution of value added in favour of shareholders. 58 It thus remains to be seen if the co-evolutionary process we are now observing will end in a stable configuration. 
